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Headnote
This paper compazes a well-known stimulus-response (SR) model and a belief-based
learning (BBL) model using experimental data from sender-receiver games. When the
models are fitted to the data by maximum likelihood, the fits aze good for both models. In
contrast to Camerer and Ho [1997], we compaze the models using a formal statistical
procedure based on the Davidson and MacKinnon P-test for non-nested hypotheses. The
motivation for using this test is that the models are naturally non-nested. Both models
involve a certain adjustment parameter, which measures the importance of forgetting.
Our results show that the outcome of the test is sensitive to the value chosen for the
adjustment pazameter. Depending on the value selected, the P-test favors the SR model,
the BBL model or neither ofthe models. A point often overlooked in empirical work is
that information from learning can only come from observations where learning occurs.
A preliminary examination suggested that our results were affected to some degree by
observations taken after behavior has converged. We adjusted the data for this
convergence effect and found that the results where not mazkedly different from our
original findings.
Keywords: Games, experiments, non-nested testing
JEL codes: C7, C9, C131. INTRODUCTION
Our objective in this paper is to use experimental data to investigate how much available
information players use when leaming how to play a game. Three appealing criteria for a
learning model are the following: (1) leaming at the level of the individual; (2) stochastic
choice; and (3) parsimony. The well-known stimulus-response SR model of Roth and
Erev [1995] satisfies all three of these criteria, besides being consistent with some of the
stylized facts established in the psychological leaming literature. The key feature of SR
learning is that it requires only minimal cognitive abilities on the part of players. This
feature of the model is appealing for those who want to show that high-rationality
predictions can be derived from a low-rationality model. A closely related feature is that
SR leaming requires only minimal infortnation. All that players need to know are the
payoffs from their own past actions; they need not know that they are playing a game,
they need not know their opponents' payoff or their past play. These two closely related
features make the SR model a natural benchmark in our investigation. In addition, it can
be applied in a wide variety of settings.
On the other hand, it seems quite likely that individuals would try to exercise
more cognitive ability and hence try to use other available information. In belief based
learning (BBL) models, like fictitious play (Robinson, 1951) or one of its stochastic
variants (Fudenberg and Kreps, 1993), the players use more infortnation than their own
historical payoffs. This information may include their own opponents' play, the play of
all possible opponents and the play of all players. Models of this kind embody a higher
level of rationality; e.g. fictitious play can be interpreted as optimizing behavior given
beliefs that are derived from Bayesian updating. In our investigation, we compare a
simple BBL model against the SR model.
We consider five experimental treatments, each with three replications. Each
replication is divided into two sessions, Session I, which is common to all treatments and
Session II, which varies across treatments, both of whích last for 20 rounds. We
concentrate on Session II data. In each treatment, there are two populations of players,senders and receivers, where in each round one sender is randomly matched with one
receiver to play a given sender-receiver game. The treatments examined here differ in
terms of the players' incentives and the infotmation that is available afier each round of
play. For one treatment, the only information available to a player is the history of play in
her own past matches. Two questions are examined for these cases. The first is whether
learning takes place. If leaming does take place, the second question is whether the
leaming is captured by SR model. In all the other treatments, there is information
available to the players in addition to the history of play in their own past matches. For
both senders and receivers, this information is the history of play of the population of
senders. Three questions aze examined for these treatments. The first again is whether
leaming takes place. If leazning does take place, the second question is whether learning
is different from that in the previous treatment, and the third is whether the BBL model
better describes learning than the SR model. The data used in this paper is from the
experiments in Blume, DeJong, Kim and Sprinkle [1997].
The initial step in our analysis was to fit the SR and BBL models to the data
generated by the various treatments. We found that, regardless of treatment, both models
fit about equally well as measured by the coefficient ofdetermination.
We let the BBL model take a form that is analogous to the SR model. In both
cases choice probabilities depend on propensities. The models differ in how the
propensities are updated. In the SR model the propensity for taking an action is solely
dependent on a player's own past payoffs from that action, whereas in the BBL model
the propensity depends on the average payoff across all players who took that action.
Owing to the similar structure, it would appear that the SR and BBL models can be
nested in an encompassing model, like that of Camerer and Ho [1997]. However, the
approach of Camerer and Ho [1997] is misleading since the propensities, which are
calculated from the estimated parameter values, differ across the models. One way to
calculate the unobserved propensities is to impose the paruneter values used in the
literature. We found, however, that these values are overwhelmingly rejected by data. For
the purpose of comparing the models, a more natural approach is to use a non-nestedtesting procedure. In this paper, we employ the Davidson and MacKinnon P-test for non-
nested hypotheses. The outcome of the P-test is sensitive to the value chosen for the
adjustment parameter. We show that depending on the value selected, the P-test favors
the SR model, the BBL model or neither of models
A point often overlooked in empirical work is that information about learning can
only come from observations where learning occurs. Once behavior has converged,
observations have no further information about leaming. Including such observations
will make the model appear to fit better, while at the same time reducing the contrast
between the models, making it difficuit to distinguish the models empirically. We call
this effect convergence bias. A preliminary examination suggested that our results were
afTected to some degree by convergence bias. Accordingly, we eliminated observations
where it appeared that learning has ceased and reanalyzed the remaining data. The results
ofthis reexamination were not markedly different from our original finding.
2. GAMES AND EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
Our data aze generated from repeated play of sender-receiver games among randomly
matched players. Players aze drawn from two populations, senders and receivers, and
rematched after each round of piay. The games played in each round are between an
informed sender and an uninformed receiver. The sender is privately informed about his
type, t, or tz, and types are equally likely. The sender sends a message, ' or ti, to the
receiver, who responds with an action, a„ a2 or a~. Payofis depend on the sender's private
information, his type, and the receiver's action, and not on the sender's message. The
payoffs used in the different treatments are given in TABLE I below, with the first entry
in each cell denoting the sender's payoff and the second entry the receiver's payoff. For
example, in Game 2, ifthe sender's type is t, and the receiver takes action aZ, the payofis
to the sender and receiver are 700,700, respectively.
A strategy for the sender maps types into messages; for the receiver, a strategy maps
messages to actions. A strategy pair is a Nash equilibrium if the strategies aze mutual
3best replies. The equilibrium is called separating ifeach sender type is identified through
his message. In a pooling equilibrium, the equilibrium action does not depend on the
sender's type; such equilibrium exists for all sender-receiver games. In Game 2, an
example of a sepazating equilibrium is one where the sender sends ~` if he is ti and ~
otherwise and the receiver takes action a2 after message' and a, otherwise. An example
of a pooling equilibrium is one in which the sender, regardless of type, sends ~` and the
receiver always takes action a,.
A replication ofa game is played with a cohort of twelve players, six senders and six
receivers. Players are randomly designated as either a sender or receiver at the start of thc
replication and keep their designation throughout. [n each period of a game, senders and
receivers are paired using a random matching procedure. Sender types are independently
and identically drawn in each period for each sender.
In each period, players then play a two-stage game. Prior to the first stage, senders
are informed about their respective types. In the first stage, senders send a message to the
receiver they are paired with. In the second stage, receivers take an action after receiving
a message from the sender they are paired with. Each sender and receiver pair then learns
the sender type, message sent, action taken and payoff received. All players next receive
information about all sender types and all messages sent by the respective sender types.
This information is displayed for the current and all previous periods ofthe replication.
To ensure that messages have no a priori meaning, each player is endowed with his
own representation of the message space, i.e. both the form that messages take and the
order in which they are represented on the screen is individualized. The message space
M-{', !~ } is observed by all players and for each player either appeazs in the order ~,t
or ', !k. Unique to each player, these messages aze then mapped into an underlying,
unobservable message space, M-{A,B}. The mappings are designed such that they
destroy all conceivable focal points that players might use for a priori coordination,
Blume et aL[1997]. The representation and ordering are stable over the replication.
Thus, the experimental design focuses on the cohort's ability to develop a language as
function ofthe game being played and the population history provided.
4Note that in this setting we learn the players' action choices, not their strategies. Also,
the players themselves receive information about actions, not strategies. They do not
observe which message (action) would have been sent (taken) by a sender (receiver) had
the sender's type (message received) been different. This is important for how we
formulate our learning rules; e.g. in our setting the hypothetical updating (see Camerer
and Ho (1997)) ofunused actions that occurs in BBL cannot rely on knowing opponents'
strategies but instead uses infonnation about the population distribution of play. For
example, for the receiver the best reply to a message that he did not receive is determined
by the distribution ofsender types that sent the messages.
The data consist of three replications for each game. Replications for Game 1 and 2
were played for 20 periods and Game 3 and 4 for 40 periods.' There were two different
treatments conducted with Game 1, one with and one without population history. In the
treatment with history, senders and receivers observe sender history, that is, the types of
drawn and the messages sent by type in all prior periods. In each replication two sessions
of the game were played. In this paper we focus on the analysis of sender behavior using
the data from the second session. The attraction of wncentrating on sender behavior is
that senders have the same number of strategies in all of our treatments. A potential
drawback of this focus is that since senders do not receive information about the history
of receiver play at the population level, they cannot form beliefs based on that
infotmation. Instead they have to make inferences from what they leam about sender
population. We also examined receiver behavior and found essentially the same results
as for senders.
3. TESTING SR AND BBL MODELS
In this section we report the results of estimation of SR and BBL models of
behavior. The models are similar in that both use propensities to determine choice
probabilities. In our extensive form game setting, we have to make a choice of whether
we want to think of players as updating propensities of actions or of strategies. Both
choices constrain the way in which the updating at one information set affects the
5updating at other information sets. If actions are updated, then there are no links across
information sets. If strategies aze updated, then choice probabilities change continually at
every information set. We chose updating of actions, which amounts to treating each
player-information set pair as a separate player. We use the index i to refer to such a pair
(n, 0), where n denotes one ofthe six senders, 0 a type realization for that sender, and the
pair i is called a player.
By SR we mean that individual play is affected only by rewards obtained from
own past play. Specifically, following Roth and Erev [1995] define the propensity, Q;~(t),
of player i to play action j a[ time t as:
(3.1) ~;i(t)-rVoQ~(t-1)t~,X,~(t-1)
where X;~(t-1) is the reward player i receives from taking action j at time t-l. Time here
measures the number ofoccurrences ofa specific type for a fixed sender; cpo measures the
lag effect (i.e. the importance of forgetting), and cp~ the contribution of the most recent
observation. Note that t is not real time. Given this specification of propensities, the
probability that player i takes actionj is a logit functionz
(3.2) P,-~ (t) - Pr(Playeri lakesaction j at time t) - Q'(~)
~Qr(~)
To complete the specification of the SR model we require an initial condition for the
propensities- the values ofQ;~(1). Values chosen for Q;~(1) afiect P;~(1) and the speed with
which rewards change probabilities of playing a particular action. In the spirit of Roth
and Erev [1995] we set Q;,(1) - Qiz(1)- 500, which is on the scale ofrewards received by
participants in the experiments.'
For these experiments we examine the behavior of senders, who can be oftwo
types. Each type could send message "1" or "2". Let y- I{message-"2"}, where I{A}
is the indicator function that takes the value 1 if event A occurs and 0 otherwise. The log
6likelihood function for the sender data is
N 1'
(3.3) ln!(wo.~Gi)-~~Y„]n(~z(r))t(1-Y„)In(1-P,i(t)).
The likelihood function was maximiud separately for each of the 15 replications using
observations from round 2 onwards. Because the quantal choice model has a regression
structure the maximi7ation can be achieved by Iteratively Re-Weighted Least Squazes,
which provides measures of fit for the non-lineaz regression. We use these measures to
describe the explanatory power ofeach specification. The results ofdoing so are shown
in TABLE II. Columns 2 and 3 of the table contain the estimates of ~po and ~p, and
columns 4 and 5 contain the log likelihood value at the optimum, and the R' statistic, the
squared correlation ccefficient between the binary dependent variable and its predicted
value. Column 6 contains the likelihood ratio test statistic for the hypothesis Ho: wo -~v~ -
1.0, parameter values consistent with mean updating.
Two features stand out in the table. First, estimates of cpo and w, aze generally
quite far from l, judging from the LR test p-values reported in column 7. Only for
G1NHR2 would the hypothesis not be rejected by the conventional statistical test.
Second, the SR model, when the parameters are chosen optimally, fits the experimental
data well, judging by the R2 values reported in column 5. Over the I S replications the SR
model explained 79"~0 of the variation in messages sent by the participants. Figure 1
shows the probability of sending message 2 for each agent type by period for the 15
replications. The line mazked with the numeral "1" shows the fraction of type 1 agents
playing message "2" each period while the line marked with a circle shows the model's
predicted fraction oftype 1 agents playing message 2. Precisely the same information is
shown for type 2 agents by the line mazked with the numeral 2(actual fraction) and a
triangle (predicted fraction). Thus, in the game shown in the top left-hand graph in the
figure - G1R1 - 50"~0 of type 1 agents play message 2 in round 1, as do SOo~o of type 2
agents. By period 7, 100"~0 oftype 1 agents play message 2, and 100"~0 of type two agents
play message 1. A similar pattern appears in replications 2 and 3 of Game 1, and in all
three replications of Game 2. A complete discussion of the empirical pattems in these
7experiments is given in Blume, DeJong, Kim, and Sprinkle [1997j. Figure I
demonstrates that SR when fitted to the experimental data of BDKS fits that data closely.
An alternative literature (e.g., van Huyck, et al [1996], Cheung and Friedman
[1997j), and Camerer and Ho [1997]) argues that variants of fictitious play -BBL --are
better characterizations of play in experiments. BBL is expected to dominate SR because
BBL uses more information, namely in our setting the experiences of other participants.
Specifically, define the propensity, Q;~(t), of player i to play actionj at time t as:
(3.4) Q;;(i)-QoQ;i~i-t)tQ,X,(r-1)
that jZ (t-1) is the average reward all players received from taking action j at time t-1.
Note that j{. - k~X ;~ t(1-k) X-;;, where k- lltt{persons playing action j in round t}
and X-;~ is the average return to all individuals other than i who play actionj. Note that if
Ho: po - p„ this is (weighted) mean updating. The choice probabilities again are logit as
in (2.2) with (2.4) replacing (2.1) as the definition of Q;~, and the likelihood function is
(2.3).
TABLE III contains the estimates for each of the 15 replications. Columns 2 and 3
of the table contain the estimates of po and p„ and columns 4 and 5 contain the log
likelihood value at the optimum, and the R2 statistic evaluated at the mle. Column 6
contains the likelihood ratio test statistic for the hypothesis EIo:[3o -[i„ the value implied
by strict mean updating.
Again, two features stand out in the table. First, estimates of po generally are
fairly close to 1, but estimates of p, aze substantially lazger, indicating that recent rewards
are given greater weight. The hypothesis that they aze given equal weight is rejected by a
wide margin in all cases, as judged by the likelihood ratio test shown in column 6.
Second, the BBL model, when the pazameters are chosen to maximize a likelihood
function, also fits the experimental data well. In the 15 cases the RZ value ranges from
.62 to .97; on average the BBL model explains 79.90~0 of the variation in messages sent.
The fit ofthis model is illustrated in Figure 2, which shows the relation of predicted
8response and actual response by period. The comparison of RZ's is suggestive: BBL
"wins" in most cases with population history information, SR wins without that
information.
4. COMPARING SR AND BBL MODELS
Figures l and 2 demonstrate the problem of distinguishing SR and BBL models of
behavior. Both SR and BBL learning fit the data well; hence, distinguishing these
models is difficult. For example, in the BDKS data the average difference in R' is .008,
and the typical sample size is 108. Thus, an eyeball test dces not show a great preference
for one leaming specification. But an eyeball test may not be very powerful in these
circumstances so resort might be had to a more formal testing procedure. Making
probabilistic comparisons between the SR and BBL models is difficult because the
models are non-nested. By anestedmodel we mean that the model being tested, the null
hypothesis, is simply a special case of the altemative model to which it is compared. In
contrast to Camerer and Ho [1997], we compare the SR and BBL models in a non-nested
framework. In particular, we employ Davidson and MacKinnon's P-test for non-nested
hypothesis testing in the following manner. Write the models described in equations
(3. I) and (3.4) and a nested composite model as:
H,:E(Y~(t))- F;íQ,-~,Xj(t -1);~)
(4.1) HZ:E(Y~(!))-F(Q,-~,Xi(!-1);~
H.: E(YiU)) -(I -a)F,(Q~-i,X;~(t -1),~V) f~:(Q,-i,X~(t -1);~
where ~p and p are (kf1) x 1 dimension vectors with k the dimensionality of X;~ , and Q;~
and Q;~ are the propensities evaluated at the estimated parameter values. Models 1 and 2
differ because X;~ s X; in general, and because the Q's differ unless the parameter
restrictions discussed above hold. (To reinforce the latter point, the two Q's are
distinguished by using a hat and a tilde.). Following Davidson and MacKinnon [1984,
91993] we test H, against H~ by replacing ~3 by its mle, ~i, and constructing the artificial
regression:
(4.2) V-"Z(y- F,)-V-"Zf,X,~rptcrV-"Z(FZ-F)tresiduul
where V""Z is the square root of the variance covariance matrix for the dichotomous
variable y. In the same fashion we test Hz against H~ by replacing ~p by its mle, ~, and
constructing a similar artificial regression. The test for nesting is a test of the hypotliesis
that a - 0. There are four outcomes that can arise from this pair of tests: (a) accept both
models; (b) reject both models; (c) accept model 1 and reject model 2; and (d) accept
model 2 and reject model 1. Obviously, the first outcome provides no evidence favoring
either model of behavior. A rejection ofboth models could occur for several reasons, one
of which is a mixture model. Specifically, the composite hypothesis H~, can also be
interpreted as the hypothesis that a percent of the population plays according to BBL and
(1-a)-percent use SR.
There are two reasons why the BBL and SR models are non-nested hypothesis,
and consequently we proceed in two steps to test the hypotheses. In the first stage we
maintain the assumption that the adjustment parameters are the same:Q~ - ~po, and that
only the specification of the X's differs between the models. Because the test statistic
depends upon which (common) value is assigned to the adjustment pazameter, we
evaluate it once at the mle for ~p, computed assuming that the SR model is correct, and
once at the mle for p, computed assuming that BBL is coaect. Finally, we compute the
P-test statistic without any constraint on the adjustment pazameter. TABLE IV contains
the absolute value of the t-statistics for testing the hypothesis a- 0 for each ofthe 15 sets
ofexperiments. In discussing these tests we use a 950~o confidence interval as a reference.
Summaries of the tests are shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3 shows that the choice ofhow propensities or attractions are updated has a
large influence on the test results. When ~io -~o - ~ïsR , as in (a), the data accept SR in
13 of 15 cases. When ~o - Qo - ~iBeL as it does in Figure 3, the evidence becomes
persuasive for BBL. [n only 4 of IS cases is SR accepted, while BBL is accepted in 14 of
1015. But when (~o and rpo are unconstrained, ~po -~o~ and Qo - ~o .~ in the artificial
regressions summarized in (c), the evidence supporting either theory is equivocal. In 8 of
I 5 cases SR is accepted, and in 8 cases BBL is accepted. Ignoring the 5 cases where both
models are accepted and the 4 cases where both cases are rejected, leaves 3 cases where
SR is accepted and BBL rejected, and precisely 3 cases where the reverse is true. Thus
the data render a Scotch verdict: the case for either model is not proved.
There is a pattem in the tests that suggests an explanation for these results. The 3
cases that support SR and reject BBL all come from the experiments G1NH. These are
the experiments where history of play information was not made available to senders or
receivers. Consequently, the case for SR behavior is stmngest here. Similarly, 2 of the 3
cases that support BBL and reject SR come from the G1 experiments where information
about the history ofplay was made available to receivers. In these experiments a stronger
a prrori case for BBL can be made. Thus, it appears that the structure of the experiment
has an important effect upon the modality ofleaming behavior that occurs.
We also examined receiver behavior. Unlike senders, receivers actually have the
information that is needed to engage in forms of leanting like fictitious play. Thus a
comparison between sender and receiver learning can inform us about the importance of
the type of information that is available at the population level. A direct comparison
between sender and receiver behavior is not possible for all experiments because
receivers frequently had more actions that they could take. However, for Gamel, both
with and without information on history ofplay, both senders and receivers faced binary
choices and a comparison could be made. Generally, the results for the receiver data
looked much like the sender data. Both SR and BBL models fit the data well, with SR
doing slightly better in the games with no history, and BBL doing better where history of
play information was available. The average difference in R' was 0.03 across the six
gameslreplications. Figure 4 summarizes the six experimental results. Overall, the test
results in Panel (c) ofthe figure show SR being the preferred model in 4 of the 6 cases,
with BBL the preferred model in the other two cases, both ofwhich were from the games
with history of play information available. Though consistent with a learning story, this
is only weak evidence in favor ofone model, and underscores our point that it is difficult
~tto tell these models apart with any degree ofprecision.
5. CONVERGENCE BIAS
It is common practice to include all observations from a particular experiment in
any statistical estimation or testing exercise based on that experiment. Yet information
about leaming can only come from observations where leaming occurs. Once behavior
has converged, observations have no further information about learning. Including such
observations will make the model appear to "fit" better, while at the same time reducing
the contrast between models, making it difficult to distinguish the models empirically.
The data shown in Figures 1 and 2 indicate that convergence typically occurs within 5 to
7 rounds, while observations are included in the estimation for the entire period, in these
data up to 20 periods. To illustrate the possible bias that this might cause we calculated
R' and average log likelihood (-maximized log likelihoodl Ik of observations used) by
progressively removing observations from the right tail, that is, by removing observations
that include convergence. Figure 5 illustrates this bias for the experiments of game l.
Under the hypothesis of no convergence bias we would expect the slopes of each line in
panels (a) and (b) of the figure to have zero slope. In fact, all four lines have positive
slope, which is characteristic of convergence bias. However, the difference between the
lines in each panel is approximately constant in these data, which suggests that
convergence bias makes both models appear to fit the data better, but does not otherwise
bias the comparison of SR and BBL.
To measure the amount of bias requires taking a position on when convergence
has occurred, a classification that is better made on individual data. We define the
convergence operator TP(y;,) by
(5) T~(Y;i) - 1 ~i Yn -Y,i-i -...-Y,i-n
- 0 el.se
12In other words a player's (pure) strategy is said to have converged if the same action is
taken p times in a row.' To eliminate convergence bias one simply excludes observation
where TP 1. We used this procedure with p- 3 and p- 4 to assess the extent ofthis bias.
We found that at least for these data, the extent of the bias was small. For example, the
non-nested hypothesis tests shown in Figure 3(c) had the same off-diagonal values (3),
while the accept -accept entry changed from 5 to 3, while the reject-reject entry changed
from 4 to 6. In other words, correcting for convergence bias sharpened the distinction
between the two models but it did not favor either model.
6. RELATED LITERATURE
There is an extensive and growing literature in experimental economics on
learning, e.g. Boylan and EI-Gamal [1993], Camerer and Ho [1997], Cheung and
Friedman [1997], Cooper and Feltovich [1996], Cox, Shachat and Walker [1995],
Crawford [1995], Roth and Erev [1995]. The literature generally focuses on two broad
classes of learning models, stimulus-response and belief based play. A wide variety of
games are considered with various designs, e.g., whether or not players are provided with
the history of the game. The perfonnances of the leanvng models are evaluated using
simulation and various statistical techniques. Unfortunately, the findings are mixed at
best. This could be due to statistical issues, Fudenberg and Levine's [1997] conjecture
that with convergence to Nash in the "short tenn," the models maybe indistinguishable, or
a combination ofthe two.
The seminal paper that deals with the stimulus-response model is Roth and Erev
[1995]. Their concern is high (super rationality) versus low (stimulus-response) game
theory and intermediate (e.g., Fudenbetg and Levine's "short term") versus asymptotic
results. Roth and Erev focus on a simple individual reinforcement dynamic in which
propensities to play a strategy are updated based upon success of past play. Using
simulation, they avoid the problem of estimation and compare the simulations to their
experiments. The simulated outcomes are similar to observed behavior and, more
13importantly, vary similarly across the different games considered. They interpret this as
robustness ofthe intermediate run outcomes to the chosen learning rule.
Roth and Erev's dynamic is similar to the reinforcement dynamic of Bush and
Mosteller [1955] and Cross [1983] except that in the latter probabilities are updated
instead of propensities. Mookherjee and Sopher [1994] evaluate the rote model of Bush
and Mosteller by comparing its performance to the belief based fic[itious play model
using logit and other statistical comparisons. In the matching pennies game with a mixed
strategy equilibrium (with and without game history), nothing works in the no
information condition. With information, average payoffs and Bush-Mosteller had some
explanatory power but not fictitious play.
Cheung and Friedman's [1997] conclusions are just the opposite. Using a variety
of games and an information condition (with and without game history), Cheung and
Friedman compare the performance of Cournot, fictitious play and rote learning. In the
extended probit, the belief based model has more support than rote learning and
information matters. Boylan and EI-Gamal [1993] compaze Coumot and fictitious play in
a broad cross-section of games obtained from other reseazchers. Using a Bayesian
approach, fictitious play is the overwhelming choice.
Van Huyck, Battalio and Rankin [1997] focus on 2x2 symmetric coordination
games and evaluate the performance of the replicator dynamic, fictitious and exponential
fictitious play. Models of reinforcement leaming can be used to justify the replicator
dynamic (e.g., Boergers and Sarin [1995]). Using the standard logit model to rank
performance, exponential fictitious play does best, followed by fictitious play and then
the replicator dynamic.
McKelvey and Palfrey's [1995] model of quantal response equilibria in normal
form games deserves some attention here. The quantal response model is Nash with
error. Mckelvey and Palfrey develop this model with a logistic quantal response
function. The equilibrium is then evaluated using the logit model and the developed
maximum likelihood estimates for the data considered. They find that the quantal
response model wins when compared to Nash without error and random choice.
Important for us is their conclusion that errors are an important component in explaining
14experimental results. This has been implicitly assumed in the previous studies when
logits and probits aze used to analyze data and explicitly assumed in the Erev and Roth
study cited below.
The lack of general findings in these and other papers has prompted a new series
of studies.' The studies can be broadly described by the approaches they take. Camerer
and Ho [1996] essentially give up on the horse race and develop a general model, which
has as special cases the principle learning models in the literature. The key that ties the
SR models to the belief BBL models is the reinforcement used. In the SR model the
reinforcement is the average of past payoffs and for BBL models it is previous expected
payoffs. When average and expected payoffs aze the same so are the models. Using
maximum likelihood estimation under the constraints of logit, Camerer and Ho evaluate
the possible contribution of the general model across a variety of games. As one would
hope, the general model explains more of the variation; note, however, that we have to
interpret this result with caution because ofthe lack of nesting.
Erev and Roth [1997] continue their focus on the SR model via simulation but
expand their analysis in two ways. First, they obtained data for games that were
conducted for ] 00 periods or more. Second, they use the error structures from the
simulations with statistical tests to compare the performance of their model with
alternative models. In particulaz, the Nash equilibrium prediction, deterministic and
stochastic fictitious plan at the aggregate level and for the within subjects comparison,
they added exponential stochastic fictitious play and best reply to the previous period.
Their model outperforms the others. The key insight is that a very simple SR model
generates simulated data that closely mirror experimental data under a wide variety of
circumstances. Furthermore, the SR model cannot easily be improved on by other (more
sophisticated ) models.
Selten [1997] is the true agnostia, He claims there is not enough data to fortn any
conclusions, either theoretical or statistical. The best we can do is very general qualitative
models (e.g., learning direction theory) in which there are tendencies that aze distinct
from random behavior but nothing more. This view brings us full circle to Fudenberg
and Levine's conjecture about whether you can distinguish among the models if
ISequilibrium play is observed in the "short term"or altematively, the statistical issues make
such comparisons moot.
The resolution ofthis debate is ultimately an empirical one. Based on the data in
this paper, we find that it is difficult to discriminate between the SR and BBL models. In
general, it appears that care are must be exercised when constructing the statistics for the
horse races and simulation comparisons that are made.
7. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we investigated how well SR and BBL models describe learning in a
sender-receiver game experiment. In the experiment an extensive form game is played
repeatedly among players who are randomly matched before each round of play. This
population-game environment is particularly appropriate for a comparison of myopic
learning rules, if we believe that it lessens the role of repeated game strategies. Sender-
receiver games with costless and apriori meaningless messages have the advantage that
no matter how we specify the incentives, coordination requires leaming. One
consequence of studying learning in extensive form games is that since players in the
experiment observe only each others' actions, not strategies, the principle difference
between the two learning models is in the roles they assign to own experience versus
population experience. Another consequence is that there are different natural
specifications even for a learning model as simple as SR; we chose the cognitively least
demanding one, in which experience at one information set does not transfer to other
information sets.
We found that both models fit our data well and the predicted choice probabilities
closely track the actual choice frequencies. It is suggestive that the BBL model fits
slightly better than SR when population information is available, and vice versa without
such information. However the differences are not lazge enough to be conclusive.
There have been recent efforts to embed both models in an encompassing model
and to perform nested tests on this modeL However, such tests are invalid if the supposed
16encompassing model involves unobserved variables whose values have to be calculated
from the pazameters of the model. Therefore a non-nested test is appropriate. Using such
a test, we found that depending on parameter choices, this test may favor either model. If
parameters aze unrestricted, both models are approximately equally often accepted and
rejected. Thus, like the comparison of fits, the formal test does not pen~nit us to choose
one model over the other. We raise the issue of convergence bias and show that for our
data correcting for this bias does not lead to better discrimination between the two
models.
Our treatment of testing with experimental data has been, from a statistical point
of view, entirely conventional. We have assumed that standard asymptotic theory
provides a reliable guide for inference in models with sample sizes encountered in
experimental economics. Consequently, we have not studied issues such as the size and
power of these tests, nor have considered the optimal design of experiments. We note
however that the theories of leaming in games are unusually rich in that they specify the
data generation process precisely enough so that statistical performance under a specific
null hypothesis can be assessed prior to obtaining the data by experimentation. Current
practice in experimental economics chooses some experimental design par~ameters by
whimsy, e.g., assigning participants to "types", choosing the number of periods to run an
experiment, allocating payoffs for particular response. Consideration of optimal
experimental design issues will allow a principled choice ofthese parameters, as has long
been the case in other sciences with experimental data.
In summary, we provide further evidence that often very simple low-rationality
models provide good descriptions of experimental leaming data. While the availability of
more information appears to favor the model that makes use of that information, it is
difficult to significantly improve on the cognitively least demanding model. The issue of
how well the available information is used appears to be difficult resolve and may require
examination of (1) whether the classical tests are valid in such settings and (2) what size
and type of data sets would permit a distinction.
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19FOOTNOTES
' We gratefully acknowledge the helpful comments of Drew Fudenberg in early
discussions and Al Roth and Ido Erev for giving us access to their software.
2 All replications had a common session, which preceded the games described above. In
particular, each cohort participated in 20 periods of a game with payoffs as in Game 1 and
a message space ofM-{A,B}. The common session provides players with experience
about experimental procedures and ensures that players understand the structure of the
game, message space and population history.
' The specification ofthe logit function in (2.2) exploits the fact that all rewards, X, in the
games that we examine aze non-negative. Were this not the case, a transform that keeps
the value of the payoffs non-negative, such as the exponential function, can be used.
" We note that in principle one could treat Q;~(1) as a factor common to all agents and
estimate its value by exploiting cross-sectional differences in play. For the experiments
that we analyze in this paper the number ofcross-section units is 6, so this is not a useful
strategy.
5 Defining convergence for mixed strategies is conceptually the same as the pure strategy
case; empirically identifying convergence is more difficult.
R The number of studies is growing at an increasing rate. Consequently, we select
representatives from the set and apologize for any omissions.
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~p, Lnl R` LR-stat P-value
0.6477 -35.44 .8233 19.9 O.Ooro
(O.S46)
0.6125 -25.89 .8728 9.4 0.20~0
(0.425)
0.8767 -44.26 .8064 ] 3.5 O.Ooro
(0.786)
O.S519 -49.46 .7309 10.9 0.1"~0
(0.3SS)
0.8658 -57.42 .6327 0.2 67.3"~0
(O.SSS)
0.9876 -40.39 .7744 13.1 O.Oo~o
(O.S28)
0.8265 -13.77 .9257 28.8 0.0"~0
(0.713)
-0.0023 -9.02 .9487 32.7 0.0"ro
(0.164)
-0.0009 -25.84 .9253 7.7 O.SaIo
(0.308)
-0.0143 -9.03 .8992 58.0 O.Ooro
(0.002)
1.4869 -70.25 .6824 4.1 4.4oro
(0.938)
2.0306 -63.40 .6802 4.1 4.4oro
(1.165)
0.2335 -70.01 .6472 15.7 0.0"~a
(0.203)
3.9301 -30.40 .8684 30.3 O.Oo~a
(2.241)
0.3408 -76.28 .6445 7.2 0.7"~0
(0.264)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses beneath coefficient estimates.
22TABLE III
Maximum Likelihood Estimates ofBBL Model
Model po p, Lnl R LR-stat P-value
G1R1 0.7839 8.2170 -27.55 .8633 24.5 0.0"ro
(N-108) (0.201) (3.580)
G1R2 0.1374 8.6047 -27.37 .8780 9.4 0.2oro
(N-108) (0.144) (2.989)
G I R3 0.8388 16.6120 -36.04 .8327 32.3 0.0"ro
(N-138) (0.129) (8.276)
G1NHR1 1.1054 1.8291 -56.92 .6831 6.0 1.4"Io
(N-108) (0.276) (1.456)
GINHR2 0.9760 1.8845 -61.72 .6173 2.0 15.3"Io
(N-108) (0.179) (1.136)
G1NHR3 0.5252 4.7377 -44.23 .7623 9.3 0.2oro
(N-108) (0.171) (1.781)
G2R1 0.1048 32.7738 -13.54 .9436 29.7 O.Ooro
(N-108) (0.062) (17.245)
G2R2 0.3271 13.3560 -11.61 .9452 24.8 O.Ooro
(N-108) (0.117) (4.354)
G2R3 0.4319 9.3153 -14.76 .9738 23.8 O.Ooro
(N-108) (0.135) (2.944)
G3R1 0.0034 52.0285 -15.61 .9249 47.1 O.Ooro
(N-108) (0.037) (19.110)
G3R2 1.5835 -0.2113 -70.23 .6883 3.8 S.Ooro
(N-138) (0.269) (0.912)
G3R3 1.9936 -1.8643 -64.65 .6700 17.1 0.0"ro
(N-138) (0.215) (0.337)
G4R1 1.7421 -0.8367 -64.45 .6706 17.4 O.Ooro
(N-138) (0.271) (0.582)
G4R2 1.0725 11.7503 -27.16 .8825 46.5 O.OoIo
(N-138) (0.220) (5.216)
G4R3 1.2841 0.6672 -74.00 .6488 7.1 0.8"ro
(N-138) (0.251) (1.146)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses beneath ccefficient estimates.
23TABLE IV
Non-Nested Tests
Model assumed True: SR Model assumed True: BBL
RO - ~VOSR
~0 - ~OBBL




G1R1 0.00 6.29 6.58 0.56 0.83 0.87
G1 R2 0.00 0.00 1.97 2.31 2.30 2.27
GIR3 0.00 4.56 4.47 0.63 0.30 0.33
GINHRI 0.00 1.46 0.44 4.96 4.17 5.31
G1NHR2 0.00 0.38 0.38 3.28 3.23 3.33
G1NHR3 0.00 0.00 1.95 3.01 3.47 6.94
G2R1 0.00 0.00 5.32 0.98 2.14 3.01
G2R2 0.00 0.00 5.79 0.00 2.32 2.22
G2R3 0.00 0.00 3.68 4.75 3.63 4.46
G3R1 0.00 1.10 0.88 1.63 0.82 0.77
G3R2 2.00 2.33 1.90 1.06 1.28 1.27
G3R3 1.79 2.39 1.88 0.17 0.90 1.95
G4Rl 0.78 1.14 1.43 6.06 0.00 0.53
G4R2 2.94 6.09 4.33 1.81 1.41 1.36
G4R3 0.00 0.28 1.73 0.98 0.34 0.70
zaExpenment ~ G I R t Expariment ~ G1RY
15
Expsnm~nt m G1R] Expervnsnl ~ G1NHR7
~f0 1S ~10
Expenmsnt ~ G2R]
~1'0 15 ~q10 1S 3-~70
Expsnment ~ G1R2 Expanmsnt ~ G~R]
Figure 1.-Plots ofthe actual and predicted fraction ofplayers sending message 2 by




























Figure 2.-Plots ofactual and predicted fractions ofplayers sending message 2 by type


















































































28R-Square Compazison By Model
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